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Abstract
The three most common school choice mechanisms are the Deferred Acceptance
mechanism (DA), the classic Boston mechanism (BM), and a variant of the Boston
mechanism where students automatically skip exhausted schools, which we call
the adaptive Boston mechanism (ABM). Assuming truthful reporting, we compare
student welfare under these mechanisms both from a conceptual and from a
quantitative perspective: We first show that, BM rank dominates DA whenever
they are comparable; and via limit arguments and simulations we show that ABM
yields intermediate student welfare between BM and DA. Second, we perform
computational experiments with preference data from the high school match in
Mexico City. We find that student welfare (in terms of rank transitions) is highest
under BM, intermediate under ABM, and lowest under DA. BM, ABM, and DA
can thus be understood to form a hierarchy in terms of student welfare. In contrast,
in (Mennle and Seuken, 2017), we have found that the same mechanisms also
form a hierarchy in terms of incentives for truthtelling that points in the opposite
direction. A decision between them therefore involves an implicit trade-off between
incentives and student welfare.
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1. Introduction
Each year, millions of children enter a new public school. To accommodate the students’
(or their parents’) preferences over schools, administrators must devise school choice
mechanisms. These are procedures that determine an assignment of students to schools
on the basis of the reported preferences. Since the seminal paper by Abdulkadirog˘lu and
So¨nmez (2003), school choice mechanisms have attracted the attention of economists,
and a growing body of research has had substantial impact on policy decisions.
1.1. Boston ‘versus’ Deferred Acceptance Mechanism
Two particular mechanisms have received the lion’s share of the attention: the Boston
mechanism and the Deferred Acceptance mechanism. Both mechanisms collect preference
reports from the students and then assign seats to students in rounds.
Under the classic Boston mechanism (BM), students first apply to their favorite school.
If a school has sufficient capacity to accommodate all applications in the first round, all
applications are accepted. Otherwise, the school accepts applications following some
priority order until its capacity is exhausted, and then it rejects all remaining applications.
Students who were rejected in the first round apply to their second-choice school in the
second round. The process repeats until all students have received a school or all schools
have reached capacity. The Boston mechanism is ubiquitous in school choice, e.g., in
Spain (Calsamiglia and Gu¨ell, 2014), Germany (Basteck, Huesmann and Nax, 2015),
and the United States (Ergin and So¨nmez, 2006).
The main motivation for letting students choose the schools through a school choice
mechanism is student welfare. Popular measures for student welfare are the number of
students who received their top choice or one of their top-3 choices. Intuitively, BM fares
well on these measures provided that students submit their preferences truthfully. The
mechanism assigns as many applicants as possible to their first choices, then does the
same with second choices in the second round, and so on. The mechanism owes much of
its popularity to the intuitive way in which it attempts to maximize these measures of
student welfare. However, BM is susceptible to strategic manipulation. In particular, it
was found to disadvantage honest participants and to have ambiguous welfare properties
in equilibrium (Ergin and So¨nmez, 2006; Abdulkadirog˘lu, Che and Yasuda, 2015).
Concerns about the manipulability of the Boston mechanism have led to its abandon-
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ment in some cities in the US and around the world. In England, “first-preference-first”
mechanisms (essentially the Boston mechanism) were even declared illegal in 2007 because
they were believed to give unfair advantage to more sophisticated students (Pathak
and So¨nmez, 2013). To address problems associated with manipulability, the Deferred
Acceptance mechanism (DA) has been proposed as an alternative. Under DA, students
also apply to schools in rounds. However, the acceptance at any school is tentative
rather than final. If in any subsequent round a student applies to a school with no free
capacity, she is not automatically rejected. Instead, she will be accepted at that school
if another student who has been previously tentatively accepted at the same school has
lower priority. In this case, the tentative acceptance of a student with lowest priority is
revoked and this student enters the next round of the application process.
On the one hand, DA makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for students. On
the other hand, given the true preferences, BM appears to produce assignments with
better student welfare. In this paper, we provide a formal justification for the latter
statement, which has remained elusive so far.
1.2. The Adaptive Boston Mechanism
So far, research on the Boston mechanism has largely focused on the classic BM described
above. However, the Boston mechanism is sometimes used in a subtly different fashion:
instead of applying to their kth choice in the kth round, in each round students apply to
their most-preferred school that still has available capacity.
For example, in the city of Freiburg, Germany, approximately 1’000 students transition
from primary schools to one of ten secondary schools each year. Initially, they are asked
to apply to their first-choice school. If this application is successful, their assignment is
finalized. Students whose applications were rejected, receive a list of schools that still
have seats available and are asked to apply to one of these schools in the second round.
This process repeats in subsequent rounds.
The procedure in Freiburg resembles the Boston mechanism, except that it prevents
students from applying to schools that have no more open seats. This alteration leads to
the adaptive Boston mechanism (ABM ). ABM eliminates the risk of “wasting one round”
by applying to an already exhausted school. Most school districts in the German state of
Nordrhein-Westfalen also use ABM, and it was used for admission to secondary schools
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in Amsterdam until 2014 (where it was replaced by DA in 2015 (de Haan et al., 2015)).
On the one hand, ABM removes some obvious opportunities for manipulation that
exist under BM. On the other hand, a student can obtain her third choice in the second
round, which may prevent another student from getting her second choice in that round.
Consequently, one would expect ABM to take an intermediate position between DA and
BM in terms of student welfare (given the true preferences). In this paper, we provide a
formal justification for this intuition.
1.3. Random Priorities in School Choice
In prior work about school choice mechanisms, most results have been obtained under
the assumption that priorities are fixed and strict. However, as Kojima and U¨nver (2014)
have pointed out, this assumption is almost always violated: Priorities are typically
coarse in practice, e.g., if they are only based on neighborhoods or siblings. Recently,
the role of priorities has been further de-emphasized; for example, walk-zone priorities in
Boston were abandoned in 2013 (Dur et al., 2014). Coarse priorities put many students
in the same priority class. Ties must then be broken, which introduces randomness into
the mechanism. In this paper, we explicitly model the randomness that arises from
coarse priorities and random tie-breaking by considering the random assignments that
arise before the tie-breaker has been implemented.
In some school choice markets there are no initial priorities at all but the priorities
are randomly generated by a single uniform lottery. For example, in 1999, the 15
neighborhoods of the Beijing Eastern City District used BM to assign students to middle
schools and priorities were determined by a single uniform lottery (Lai, Sadoulet and
de Janvry, 2009). Similarly, the second phase of the school choice procedure in New
York City used Deferred Acceptance with priorities derived in this way (Pathak and
Sethuraman, 2011); and most cities in Estonia employ DA with single uniform priorities
for elementary school assignment (Lauri, Po¨der and Veski, 2014). While in most school
choice markets, priorities are not solely based on a single uniform lottery, the coarse
nature of priorities is arguably closer to this assumption than to the assumption of strict
and fixed priorities. All of our findings in this paper hold at least for single uniform
priorities, but most of them generalize to arbitrary priority structures with or without
randomization.
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1.4. A Motivating Example
In this paper, we uncover the relationships of BM, ABM, and DA in terms of student
welfare when students report their preferences truthfully, independent of incentives. To
obtain an intuition about these relationships, consider a market with four students,
conveniently named 1, 2, 3, 4, and four schools, named a, b, c, d, with a single seat each.
Suppose that the students’ preferences are
P1 : a ą b ą c ą d, P2, P3 : a ą c ą b ą d, P4 : b ą a ą c ą d, (1)
where Pi : x ą y indicates that student i prefers school x to school y. Furthermore,
suppose that priorities are determined by a single uniform lottery. If the students report
truthfully, the probabilities of each student obtaining each of the seats are as follows:
BM ABM DA
Student a b c d a b c d a b c d
1 1{3 0 0 2{3 1{3 0 1{3 1{3 1{3 1{4 1{6 1{4
2 & 3 1{3 0 1{2 1{6 1{3 0 1{3 1{3 1{3 1{24 3{8 1{4
4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2{3 1{12 1{4
To compare these assignments, we consider the cumulative rank distributions (Feath-
erstone, 2011) (i.e., the expected numbers of students who receive one of their top-k
choices for k “ 1, . . . , 4). These are:
Mechanism k “ 1 k “ 2 k “ 3 k “ 4
BM 2 3 3 4
ABM 2 2` 2{3 3 4
DA 1` 2{3 2` 2{3 3 4
Observe that ABM and BM assign the same number of first choices but ABM assigns
strictly fewer top-2 choices. Thus, BM yields higher student welfare in the sense that
its rank distribution first order-stochastically dominates the rank distribution of ABM.
Similarly, DA assigns less first choices than ABM, but for ranks 2 through 4, their
cumulative rank distributions coincide. Thus, the rank distribution of ABM first order-
stochastically dominates the rank distribution of DA. Consequently, in this example BM
dominates ABM which in turn dominates DA.
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1.5. Contributions
In this paper, we expose the hierarchical relationship between the three most common
school choice mechanisms, BM, ABM, and DA, in terms of student welfare from a
conceptual and from a quantitative perspective. Conceptually, we show that BM rank
dominates DA whenever this comparison is possible (Theorem 1), that ABM is not rank
dominated by DA in the limit (Theorem 2), and that BM rank dominates ABM much
more frequently than vice versa (Section 4.5). Quantitatively, we conduct computational
experiments on preference data from the high school match in Mexico City (Section 5),
where we find that, given true preferences, BM assigns more top-k choices than ABM or
DA for k ď 5 and that ABM assigns more top-k choices than DA for k ď 7.
In (Mennle and Seuken, 2017), we showed that while ABM is not strategyproof, it has
better incentive properties than BM. This formally captures the intuition that “not letting
students apply to exhausted schools” improves incentives. Our findings complement this
insight by a second hierarchy in terms of student welfare in the opposite direction. A deci-
sion between the three most common school choice mechanisms thus involves an implicit
trade-off between incentives and student welfare: first, if strategyproofness is a strict
requirement, DA is obviously the mechanism of choice. Second, when administratoris
believe that not letting students apply to exhausted schools provides sufficient incentives
to elicit truthful preferences, then ABM may be a design alternative because in this case
it improves student welfare, relative to DA. Finally, if the true preferences are known or
if students can be expected to report their preferences truthfully (despite the absence of
strategyproofness guarantees), then BM yields the highest student welfare. We do not
advocate superiority of either mechanism; instead, our insights allow administrators to
make a conscious and informed decision about the implicit trade-off that they face when
choosing between BM, ABM, and DA.
2. Related Work
The classical Boston mechanism has received significant attention because it is frequently
used for the assignment of students to public schools in many school districts around
the world. The mechanism has been heavily criticized for its manipulability: For the
case of strict priorities, Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) showed that BM is neither
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strategyproof nor stable. They suggested the Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and
Shapley, 1962) as an alternative that is stable and strategyproof for students. Ergin
and So¨nmez (2006) showed that BM can have undesirable outcomes in full information
equilibrium. Experimental studies, such as those conducted by Chen and So¨nmez (2006)
and Pais and Pinter (2008), revealed that it is indeed manipulated more frequently by
human subjects than strategyproof alternatives.
Kojima and U¨nver (2014) provided an axiomatic characterization of the Boston
mechanism for the case of fixed, strict priorities. However, they also pointed out that
the assumption of fixed, strict priorities is usually violated in school choice problems.
Some recent work has considered coarse priorities and revealed a number of surprising
insights: Abdulkadirog˘lu, Che and Yasuda (2015) demonstrated that in a setting with
random priorities and perfectly correlated student preferences, BM can lead to higher ex-
ante welfare than Deferred Acceptance in equilibrium. Similarly, simulations conducted
by Miralles (2008) illustrated that with single uniform tie-breaking and no priorities,
equilibria of the Boston mechanism can yield higher ex-ante welfare. It has remained an
open research question if and how the Boston mechanism can be understood to yield
higher student welfare for general priority structures. Our present paper addresses this
question: We show that, given truthful preferences, BM rank dominates the Deferred
Acceptance mechanism whenever the two mechanisms are comparable, and, using actual
student preferences from the Mexico City high school match, we show that BM assigns
substantially more top-k choices than DA for k ď 7.
While the majority of prior work was focused on the classical Boston mechanism, the
idea of an adaptive adjustment has previously been discussed as well. Alcalde (1996)
studied a “now-or-never” mechanism for two-sided marriage markets, where men propose
to their most-preferred available partner in each round. Miralles (2008) informally argued
that an adaptive order of applications may improve the position of unsophisticated (i.e.,
truthful) students. For the case when priorities are strict and fixed, Dur (2015) provided
an axiomatic characterization of the adaptive Boston mechanism. Furthermore, he
showed that BM is at least as manipulable as ABM in the sense of (Pathak and So¨nmez,
2013). If some students are unacceptable to some schools, then he also presented an
example showing that BM is in fact more manipulable than ABM.
7
3. Preliminaries
Preferences. Let N be a set of n students and let M be a set of m schools. We use i to
refer to particular students and j or a, b, c, . . . to refer to particular schools. Each school j
has a capacity of qj ě 1 seats, and we assume that there are enough seats to accommodate
all students (i.e., n ď q1 ` . . .` qm).1 Students have strict preferences Pi over schools,
where Pi : a ą b means that student i prefers school a over school b. The set of all
possible preference orders is denoted by P . A preference profile P “ pP1, . . . , Pnq P PN
is a collection of preferences of all students, and we denote by P´i the collection of
preferences of all students except i, so that we can write P “ pPi, P´iq.
Priorities. A priority order pij is a strict ordering of the students, where pij : i ą i1
means that student i has priority over student i1 at school j, and we denote by Π the
set of all possible priority orders. A priority profile is a collection of priority orders
pi “ ppijqjPM P ΠM . pi is a single priority profile if the priority orders of all schools are
the same (i.e., pij “ pij1 for all j, j1 P M), otherwise pi is a multiple priority profile. A
priority distribution is a probability distribution P over priority profiles. P is a single
priority distribution if it only randomizes over single priority profiles, or equivalently,
supppPq contains only single priority profiles. A priority distribution P supports all single
priority profiles if any single priority profile is chosen with strictly positive probability
(i.e., Prpis ą 0 for all single priority profiles pi). The uniform distribution over all single
priority profiles is called the single uniform priority distribution and denoted by U.
Assignments. A random assignment is represented by an nˆm-matrix x “ pxi,jqiPN,jPM ,
where the entry xi,j is the probability that student i receives a seat at school j. x is
feasible if xi,j P r0, 1s for all i, j (i.e., each entry is a probability), řjPM xi,j “ 1 for
all i (i.e., each student receives a seat with probability 1), and
ř
iPN xi,j ď qj for all j
(i.e., no school’s seats are assigned beyond capacity). x is a deterministic assignment if
xi,j P t0, 1u for all i, j.2 Let X and ∆pXq be the sets of all feasible deterministic and
random assignments respectively.
1Otherwise, we can add a dummy school with capacity n which all students rank last.
2By virtue of the Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem and its extensions (Budish et al., 2013), it suffices
to consider the matrix representation as they can be represented as lotteries over deterministic
assignments.
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Mechanisms. A school choice mechanism is a mapping ϕ : ΠM ˆ PN Ñ X that
receives as input a priority profile pi P ΠM and a preference profile P P PN and selects
a deterministic assignment based on this input. For a given priority distribution P,
the respective random school choice mechanism (or just mechanism for short) is the
mapping ϕP : PN Ñ ∆pXq that receives the students’ preferences P and selects the
random assignment by drawing a priority profile pi according to P and applying ϕ to
ppi, P q; formally,
ϕPpP q “
ÿ
piPΠM
ϕppi, P q ¨ Prpis. (2)
If P is a priority distribution that selects a particular priority profile pi with certainty,
then we may write ϕpi to denote the deterministic mechanism ϕP “ ϕppi, ¨q.
Common School Choice Mechanisms. In this paper, we consider the three most
common school choice mechanisms, which assign students in rounds. Consider a given
priority profile pi P ΠM and a given preference profile P P PN .
Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA). In the first round of DA each student i applies
to the school that is ranked first under Pi. Each school j tentatively accepts applications
according to pij until all seats at j are filled, then j rejects all remaining applications. In
subsequent rounds all students who are not tentatively accepted at some school apply to
their most-preferred school that has not rejected them yet. Then each school j considers
the set of students who are currently tentatively accepted at j and the set of students
who have newly applied to j in this round. Of these students j tentatively accepts
applications according to pij until all seats at j are filled, then j rejects all remaining
applications. When no school receives a new application all tentative assignments are
finalized. Note that a student who has been tentatively accepted at some school, may be
rejected from this school in a later round if another student with higher priority applies
at that school.
Classical Boston mechanism (BM). The first round of BM is the same as under DA,
except that the acceptances are final (not tentative). In round k, all students who have
not been accepted at any school in previous rounds, apply to their kth-choice school, and
schools accept students into remaining open seats according to priority. Since acceptances
are final, no student who has been accepted at a school, will be displaced by other
students in later rounds, even if they have priority.
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Mechanism Ex-post efficient Ordinally efficient˚˚ On efficient frontier˚˚˚
BMP 3 7 7
ABMP 3 7 7
DAP 7/3˚ 7 7
Table 1: Comparison of BM, ABM, and DA in terms of efficiency notions. ˚: DAP is
ex-post efficient for single priority distributions but not ex-post efficient in
general. ˚˚: For non-deterministic priorities (see Appendix F); for deterministic
priorities, ex-post and ordinal efficiency coincide. ˚˚˚: For the single uniform
priority distribution U, neither mechanism is on the efficient frontier, subject
to their respective incentive properties and symmetry (see Appendix G).
Adaptive Boston mechanism (ABM). ABM works like BM, except that in each round
students apply to their most-preferred school that still has at least one open seat. For
example, if a student’s second-choice school has filled up in the first round, this student
applies to her third choice in the second round instead. Given any priority distribution P,
we construct the corresponding random mechanisms DAP, BMP, and ABMP according
to (2).
4. Student Welfare Comparison by Rank Dominance
Student welfare in school choice mechanisms is usually assessed using efficiency notions.
However, these notions do not allow for a meaningful comparison of BM, ABM, and DA
(Section 4.1). Instead, we use rank dominance to establish the hierarchy in terms of
student welfare (Sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5).
4.1. Challenges in Comparing Student Welfare
Table 1 provides an overview of how BM, ABM, and DA compare by different efficiency
notions. We observe that all three mechanisms largely look alike: They produce ex-post
efficient assignments (except DAP when multiple priority profiles are possible) but neither
of them is also ordinally efficient. Moreover, as we show in Appendix G, for the single
uniform priority distribution U, none of the mechanisms lie on the efficient frontier. The
fact that traditional efficiency notions fail to differentiate between BM, ABM, and DA
necessitates our comparison in terms of rank distributions.
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4.2. Rank Distributions and Rank Dominance
The rank distribution of an assignment consists of the numbers of students who receive
their first, second, third, etc. choices. It is frequently used as a welfare criterion (e.g.,
see (Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak and Roth, 2009; Budish and Cantillon, 2012)).
Definition 1 (Rank Distribution and Rank Dominance). Consider a preference profile
P and two assignments x, y P ∆pXq. Let rankP pi, jq denote the rank of school j in Pi
(i.e., the number of schools that student i weakly prefers to j). Let
dxl “
ÿ
iPN, jPM : rankP pi,jq“l
xi,j (3)
be the expected number of students who receive their lth choice under x and let cxk “řk
l“1 d
x
l be the expected number of students who receive one of their top-k choices under
x. The vector cx “ pcx1 , . . . , cxmq is called the cumulative rank distribution of x at P . We
say that x rank dominates y at P if cxk ě cyk for all ranks k P t1, . . . ,mu. This dominance
is strict if the inequality is strict for at least one rank k.
Featherstone (2011) formalized rank dominance as a way of comparing social welfare
under ordinal assignment mechanisms. It captures the intuition that assigning two first
and one second choices is socially preferable to assigning one first and two second choices.
But of course, some students may prefer their assignment under y to their assignment
under x, even if x rank dominates y. Thus, choosing a rank dominant x is not necessarily
a Pareto improvement. Instead, it can be thought of as a tough decision taken by the
administrator: By choosing a rank dominant assignment the overall rank distribution
improves but some students receive assignments they like less.
In the following we compare the assignments BMPpP q, ABMPpP q, and DAPpP q by
their rank dominance relation at P , where P is the true preference profile.
4.3. Comparing BM and DA
Our second main result in this paper is that BM rank dominates DA whenever the
outcomes of the two mechanisms are comparable.
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Theorem 1. For any priority distribution P and any preference profile P P PN , if
BMPpP q and DAPpP q are comparable by rank dominance at P , then BMPpP q rank
dominates DAPpP q at P .
Proof Outline (formal proof in Appendix A). For any fixed single priority profile pi, we
first prove the following statement: If DApi rank dominates BMpi at some preference
profile, the assignments from both mechanisms must coincide. This insight allows us
to formulate an extension argument and obtain rank dominance for any single priority
distribution. For the case of fixed multiple priority profiles, Harless (2015) proved the
statement about coincidence of the assignments. Observing that his proof is essentially
analogous to ours, we can re-use our extension argument to obtain rank dominance of
BMP over DAP for arbitrary priority distributions P.
Theorem 1 establishes a formal understanding of our intuition that, given truthful
preferences, BM produces the more appealing assignments: If the assignments from BM
and DA are comparable in terms of rank dominance, then the assignment from BM
yields higher student welfare. The significance of Theorem 1 is further emphasized by
the fact that traditional notions of efficiency are unable to differentiate between the two
mechanisms, as shown in Section 4.1.
Simulations. It is not difficult to construct an example where BM and DA are not com-
parable by rank dominance (see Example 3 in Appendix B). Therefore, the impact of The-
orem 1 for practical market design depends on the frequency with which the assignments
from BM and DA are comparable. We conduct simulations to estimate this frequency.
Specifically, we consider settings with m “ 10 schools, n P t50, 100, . . . , 950, 11000u
students, and evenly distributed capacities qj “ q “ n{m, j P M . In each setting we
sample 10’000 preference profiles P uniformly at random and we sample a single priority
profile pi for each P . We then compute the assignments BMpipP q and DApipP q and
compare them by their rank distribution.3 By Theorem 1 there are three possible cases:
(1) BMpipP q strictly rank dominates DApipP q, (2) BMpipP q and DApipP q have the same
rank distribution, or (3) BMpipP q and DApipP q are incomparable by rank dominance.
3By fixing a priority profile pi the simulations show the rank dominance relation from an ex-post
perspective. We take this approach because it is computationally infeasible to compute the random
assignments from BMU, ABMU, and DAU for settings of any meaningful size.
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Figure 1: Comparison of BMpipP q and DApipP q by rank dominance for 10’000 preference
profiles P sampled uniformly at random in settings with m “ 10 schools,
n P t50, 100, . . . , 11000u students, qj “ n{m.
The results of our simulation are shown in Figure 1. The share of preference profiles
where BMpi and DApi are comparable by rank dominance (cases (1) & (2)) is 24% for
smaller settings and 8% for the largest setting (n “ 11000). Moreover, case (2) (where
the rank distributions are exactly the same) occurs with a frequency of less than 0.1%
in settings with 250 or more students. Thus, in a city like Freiburg, Germany, with
10 schools and 1’000 students, we would expect BM to produce an assignment with
unambiguously and strictly higher student welfare than DA in 8% of the cases (assuming
uniformly distributed and truthful preferences).
The advantage of BM in terms of student welfare contrasts with the advantage of
DA in terms of incentives. In this sense, Theorem 1 and Figure 1 identify a cost of
strategyproofness that one incurs when choosing Deferred Acceptance over the classical
Boston mechanism because strategyproofness is a strict requirement. Put differently, our
findings demonstrate the improvements that BM would yield if students reported their
preferences truthfully, despite the absence of strategyproofness guarantees.
4.4. Comparing ABM and DA
Towards comparing student welfare under ABM and DA one can again attempt a com-
parison by the rank dominance relation. The motivating example from the introduction
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shows that ABMU can strictly rank dominate DAU at some preference profile. However,
surprisingly, the opposite may also hold, as the following example shows.
Example 1. Consider a setting with six students N “ t1, . . . , 6u, six schools M “
ta, . . . , fu with a single seat each, and the preference profile P “ pP1, . . . , P6q with
P1, . . . , P4 : a ą b ą c ą d ą e ą f and P5, P6 : e ą b ą a ą d ą f ą c.
It is straightforward to compute the assignments ABMUpP q and DAUpP q. The corre-
sponding cumulative rank distributions are cABM
UpP q “ p2, 3, 4, 5, 5, 6q and cDAUpP q “
p2, 3, 4, 5, 5` 1{3, 6q. Thus, DAUpP q strictly rank dominates ABMUpP q at P .
From Example 1 it is clear that a statement analogous to Theorem 1 does not hold
between ABM and DA.4 To recover a meaningful comparison, we resort to two limit
arguments. We consider two notions in which markets get large: The first resembles large
school choice markets, where the number of schools remains constant but the number of
students and the schools’ capacities grow. The second resembles large house allocation
markets, where each school has a single seat, but the number of students and schools
grow. For both notions we show that the share of preference profiles where DAU rank
dominates ABMU (even weakly) vanishes in the limit.
Theorem 2. Let pNn,Mn, qnqně1 be a sequence of settings such that
1. either Mn “M and n “ řjPM qnj for all n, and minjPM qj pnÑ8qÝÑ 8,
2. or |Mn| “ n and qnj “ 1 for all n and all j PMn,
then
#tP : DAUpP q weakly rank dominates ABMUpP q at P u
#tP preference profileu
pnÑ8qÝÑ 0. (4)
Proof Outline (formal proof in Appendix C). For case 1, we prove the stronger statement
that the share of preference profiles where DAU assigns the same number of first
choices as ABMU converges to zero. We give a bound for this share in terms of
multinomial coefficients. Here, we must separately treat the conditional probabilities of
4We can replace U in Example 1 by the single priority profile pi : 1 ą . . . ą 6 and observe that DApipP q
still strictly rank dominates ABMpipP q at P . Thus, the comparison between ABM and DA in terms
of rank dominance remains ambiguous, even if we restrict attention to fixed single priority profiles.
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Figure 2: Comparison of ABMpipP q and DApipP q by rank dominance for 10’000 preference
profiles P sampled uniformly at random in settings with m “ 10 schools,
n P t50, 100, . . . , 11000u students, qj “ n{m.
the different cases that schools are un-demanded, under-demanded, over-demanded, or
exactly exhausted as first choices. Case (2) follows in a similar fashion, but the proof
is more involved as it requires the new notion of overlap for preference profiles. We
establish an upper bound for the share of profiles using 2-associated Stirling numbers of
the second kind and variants of the Stirling approximation.
The surprising finding that DAU may strictly rank dominate ABMU (Example 1)
challenges our initial hypothesis that ABMU yields higher student welfare. However,
Theorem 2 alleviates this concern at least from a large market perspective.5
Simulations. The value of Theorem 2 for practical market design again depends on
the frequency of preference profiles where ABM rank dominates DA and the frequency
of those preference profiles where DA rank dominates ABM (the surprising case from
Example 1) in settings of meaningful size. To estimate these frequencies we conduct
simulations analogous to those in Section 4.3. The results are shown in Figure 2. First,
we observe that DApi strictly rank dominates ABMpi for only 0.1% of the preference
profiles for n “ 50 students; for n ě 300 students not a single such preference profile
occurs in the sample. This suggests that the rate of convergence in Theorem 2 is high
5Interestingly, complete enumeration reveals that DAU does not strictly rank dominate ABMU for any
setting with less than 6 schools (with unit capacity). In this sense, Example 1 is minimal.
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and that the problematic cases where DApi rank dominates ABMpi are pathological and
should not be a concern for practical market design. Second, we observe that ABMpi
produces assignments with unambiguously higher student welfare for between 20% of
the preference profiles for smaller settings and 7% for larger settings. For 10 schools and
1’000 students, we would expect ABMpi to produce an assignment with unambiguously
and strictly higher student welfare than DA in 7% of the cases (assuming uniformly
distributed and truthful preferences).
Our limit result Theorem 2 and our simulations identify an advantage of ABM over
DA in terms of student welfare (given truthful preferences). Thus, a decision between
these two mechanisms can be viewed as a trade-off between the full (instead of partial)
strategyproofness of DA and the higher student welfare under ABM. For situations
where partial strategyproofness (Mennle and Seuken, 2017) is sufficient to elicit truthful
preferences, these results demonstrate the improvements in student welfare that ABM
yields relative to DA.
4.5. Comparing BM and ABM
Finally, we compare BM and ABM. The motivating example in the introduction
illustrates that BMU may strictly rank dominate ABMU. However, surprisingly, the
opposite is also possible.
Example 2. Consider a setting with five students N “ t1, . . . , 5u, five schools M “
ta, . . . , eu with a single seat each, and the preference profile P “ pP1, . . . , P5q with
P1, P2 : a ą b ą c ą d ą e, P3, P4 : a ą d ą c ą e ą b, P5 : b ą . . . .
As in Example 1 we can compute the cumulative rank distributions cBM
UpP q “ p2, 3, 4, 4`
1{3, 5q and cABMUpP q “ p2, 3, 4, 4 ` 1{2, 5q. Since 4 ` 1{2 ą 4 ` 1{3, ABMUpP q strictly
rank dominates BMUpP q at P .6
Unfortunately, a theoretical result that establishes a rank dominance relationship
between BM and ABM (even in the limit) appears currently out of reach. Therefore,
we rely on simulations for this comparison. As in the comparison of ABM and DA in
6For the deterministic case the example holds with the single priority profile pi : 1 ą 3 ą 4 ą 2 ą 5.
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Figure 3: Comparison of BMpipP q and ABMpipP q by rank dominance for 10’000 preference
profiles P sampled uniformly at random in settings with m “ 10 schools,
n P t50, 100, . . . , 11000u students, qj “ n{m.
Section 4.4, we want to estimate the frequencies of preference profiles where (1) ABMpi
strictly rank dominates BMpi and those where (2) BMpi strictly rank dominates ABMpi.
The results are shown in Figure 3. First, the share of the problematic cases (1) is
below 0.6% across all settings and reduces to 0.1% for n “ 11000 students. Thus, albeit
their occasional occurrence, cases like Example 2 are the exception. Second, the share of
preference profiles where BMpi strictly rank dominates ABMpi is between 21% and 28%
across all settings.7 Thus, BMpi and ABMpi are frequently comparable and in these cases
BMpi almost always rank dominates ABMpi.
These results show that we can expect BM to produce assignments that are more
appealing in terms of student welfare and that we can expect cases where the opposite
is true to be very rare. Analogous to the cost of strategyproofness we identified by
comparing BM and DA (see Section 4.3), this difference in terms student welfare can
be viewed as a cost of partial strategyproofness when choosing ABM over BM. In other
words, we identify the gains in student welfare that could be obtained by using BM
instead of ABM if students reported their preferences truthfully, despite the absence of
any strategyproofness guarantees.
In summary, in Section 4, we have shown that whenever BM, ABM, and DA are
7For n “ 101000 students (not shown in Figure 3) this share reduces to around 10%. Based on this
observation, we conjecture that it does converge to 0 as settings get larger, albeit slowly.
17
comparable by rank dominance, then the rank dominance relation generally points in the
expected direction with some notable exceptions. Thus, we have established a hierarchy
between BM, ABM, and DA in terms of student welfare (given truthful preferences),
which is the exact inverse of the hierarchy in terms of incentives (from (Mennle and
Seuken, 2017)).
5. Student Welfare Comparison by Rank Transitions
So far, we have compared BM, ABM, and DA by rank dominance. However, we have
also observed that they are not comparable in this way for many preference profiles. For
this reason we now introduce rank transitions and apply this concept to obtain a more
general albeit slightly weaker comparison of BM, ABM, and DA.
5.1. Rank Transitions
First, we introduce rank transitions, a generalization of rank dominance. The notion
of rank transitions is motivated by a common welfare criterion: In many school choice
markets it is the express objective to assign as many students as possible to their first
choice, to one of their top-3 choices, or generally to one of the their top-k choices. Rank
transitions capture this criterion formally.
Definition 2 (K-Rank Dominance and Rank Transition). Consider a preference profile
P and two assignments x, y P ∆pXq with cumulative rank distributions cx and cy at P
respectively. For any rank K P t1, . . . ,mu we say that x K-rank dominates y at P if
cxk ě cyk for all ranks k P t1, . . . , Ku. The largest rank K for which x K-rank dominates
y at P is called the rank transition (between x and y at P ).
K-rank dominance of an assignment x over another assignment y means that x rank
dominates y up to rank K. For example, if our primary objective is to assign as many
students as possible to their top-3 choices, then we prefer a 3-rank dominant assignment.
Conversely, if the rank transition between x and y is 5, then we prefer x over y if we
care specifically to assign as many students as possible to their top-k choices for any
k ď 5. A higher rank transition between two mechanisms therefore implies a stronger
differentiation between them in terms of student welfare, provided that we care about
top-k choices.
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Figure 4: Stylized example of cumulative rank distributions and rank transitions.
Figure 4 shows stylized rank distributions for BM, ABM, and DA. In this example,
the rank transition between ABM and DA lies at KpABM,DAq “ 3. This means that
ABM assigns (weakly) more top-1, top-2, and top-3 choices than DA, but fails to assign
more top-4 choices. The rank transitions between BM and DA and between BM and
ABM lie at KpBM,DAq “ 4 and KpBM,ABMq “ 5 respectively.
5.2. Influence of Setting Parameters on Rank Transitions
In this section, we study how variations in the setting parameters influence the rank
transitions between BM, ABM, and DA. Specifically, we consider the number of students
n, the number of schools m, and correlation in the students’ preferences α. Arnosti
(2016) proved single crossing properties that hold in continuum markets. These results
do not apply directly to the finite settings that we study. However, based on Arnosti’s
insights for continuum markets, we formulate four hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 Holding m fixed and adjusting capacities to accommodate all students,
rank transitions are independent of n.
Hypothesis 2 Holding n fixed and adjusting capacities to accommodate all students,
rank transitions increase with m.
Hypothesis 3 Holding n, m, and capacities fixed, rank transitions increase with α.
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Figure 5: Influence of setting parameters n (a), m (b), α (c) on rank transitions
Hypothesis 4 The order of the rank transitions is as shown in Figure 4:
KpABM,DAq ď KpBM,DAq ď KpBM,ABMq. (5)
We assess these hypotheses via simulations. Figure 5 shows plots of estimated rank
transitions for varying setting parameters.
Towards Hypothesis 1 we consider settings withm “ 10 schools, n P t100, 200, . . . , 11000u
students, and capacities qj “ q “ n{m. In each setting we sample 100’000 (uncorre-
lated) preference profiles P uniformly at random and a single priority profile pi for each
P . We estimate the expected rank distribution by averaging the rank distributions
across all samples. Then we compute the rank transitions KpABM,DAq, KpBM,DAq,
and KpBM,ABMq. As we see in Figure 5 (a), the rank transitions are constant at
KpABM,DAq “ 2, KpBM,DAq “ 3, and KpBM,ABMq “ 5 across all settings, which is
in line with Hypothesis 1.
Towards Hypothesis 2 we consider settings withm P t10, 15, . . . , 100u schools, capacities
qj “ q “ n{m, and n « 11000 students (if n “ 11000 is not divisible by m, we reduced
n to the highest multiple of m below 1’000). Figure 5 (b) shows the estimated rank
transitions. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, they grow as the number of schools increases.
Towards Hypothesis 3 we consider settings with n “ 11000 students, m “ 10 schools,
20
and capacities qj “ 100. We correlate the students’ preferences by sampling vNM utility
profiles with common and private value components, where α P t0.00, 0.05, . . . , 0.90, 0.95u
is the share of the common value component in each student’s utility function.8 Figure
5 (c) shows the estimated rank transitions. Again, we observe that they grow as the
correlation α increases, which is consistent with Hypothesis 3 (with the exception of
KpBM,ABMq “ 4 for α “ 0.15).
Finally, observe that in all three plots, the order of the rank transitions is the same
for all settings and consistent with Hypothesis 4, namely that the order of the rank
transitions is KpABM,DAq ď KpBM,DAq ď KpBM,ABMq.
These results show that rank transitions are a meaningful way to assess differences
in student welfare under BM, ABM, and DA: when the rank dominance comparison
between them is inconclusive, we can still expect that BM dominates ABM which in turn
dominates DA up to their respective rank transitions. However, the setting parameters
n, m, and α are usually outside the control of the administrator. In order to understand
the differences in student welfare that we expect in practice, we must measure the rank
transitions on actual student preferences.
5.3. Rank Transitions in Practice: Evidence from the Mexico City
High School Match
In this section, we present results from computational experiments with student preference
data from high school admissions in Mexico City from years 2010 through 2014. We
find that student welfare in terms of rank transitions is highest under BM, intermediate
under ABM, and lowest under DA (given truthful preferences).
In Mexico City around 280’000 students are assigned to around 600 educational options
at public high schools each year. The assignment is centrally organized by Comisio´n
Metropolitana de Instituciones Pu´blicas de Educacio´n Media Superior (COMIPEMS).
In the Main Phase students submit rank-ordered lists of up to 20 options. DA is used
to compute the assignment, where a standardized exam determines the (single) priority
structure. Around 85% of the students are assigned in the Main Phase. In a Second
8This approach follows prior work (Erdil and Ergin, 2008; Budish and Cantillon, 2012; Abdulkadirog˘lu,
Che and Yasuda, 2015; Mennle et al., 2015): We draw common values pvjqjPM from U r0, 1sM and
for each student i we draw private values pwi,jqjPM from U r0, 1sM . Student i’s utility for school j is
given by uipjq “ αvj ` p1´ αqwi,j .
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Figure 6: Rank distributions and rank transitions between BMU, ABMU, and DAU for
student preferences from Mexico City high school match in 2014
Phase the remaining 15% are assigned to options with excess capacity in a decentralized
process. The data for our computational experiments consists of the rank-ordered lists
submitted by the students during the Main Phase in the years 2010 through 2014.
Following prior work by Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak and Roth (2009), we use the number of
students assigned to each option during the Main Phase as a proxy for capacity.9
We are interested in identifying the rank distributions and rank transitions that arise
from applying BMU, ABMU, and DAU in the Main Phase of the Mexico City high school
match. To estimate these we sample 2’000 single priority profiles uniformly at random
and average the resulting rank distributions. Figure 6 shows the results for the preference
data from 2014. All estimated values are statistically different (paired t-test,10 Student
p ă 0.001).
First, we observe that the rank distributions have the single crossing structure that
we hypothesized in Section 5.2. Thus, rank transitions are indeed a meaningful measure
9We give a detailed description of the data and our analysis in Appendix D. We are grateful to Juan
Sebastia´n Pereyra, who ran the experiment software for us on a proprietary computer system of
ECARES at the Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles in Brussles, Belgium.
10For each rank we use the Shapiro-Wilk test to ascertain normality of the sample differences. Subse-
quently we use the Student’s t-test for paired samples to test for difference.
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of differences in student welfare. The rank transitions for 2014 are
KpABM,DAq “ 5 ă KpBM,DAq “ 7 ă KpBM,ABMq “ 9. (6)
This means that while the assignments are not directly comparable by rank dominance,
we see that BMU rank dominates DAU up to rank K “ 7, ABMU rank dominates DAU
up to rank K “ 5, and ABMU is rank dominated by BMU up to rank K “ 9. Thus,
if we care about students’ top-k choices for k ď 5, the three mechanisms form a clear
hierarchy in terms of student welfare on the preferences of students from Mexico City,
with BM outperforming ABM which in turn outperforms DA.
Second, we observe that on average DAU assigns 97’103 students to their first choices
(34.1% of all students). In contrast, BMU and ABMU assign 134’545 (47.3%) first choices
(i.e., 37’442 more), a substantial improvement. At the same time, relative to DAU, BMU
and ABMU leave 8’042 (2.8%) and 5’207 (1.8%) additional students to be assigned in the
Second Phase respectively. Thus, if we care most about first choices, BMU and ABMU
vastly improve student welfare but at the cost of a small increase in the number of
students who must be assigned in the Second Phase (and of course the fact that neither
BMU nor ABMU are strategyproof).
Remark 1. We have conducted the same analysis on the preference data from Mexico
City for all years 2010–2014 and for the single and multiple uniform priority distribution.
The findings are consistent across all years and priority distributions and are given in
Appendix D.
In summary, we find that when applied to student preferences from Mexico City,
student welfare is highest under BM, intermediate under ABM, and lowest under DA
(given truthful preferences). This refines our understanding of the hierarchical relationship
of the three mechanisms in terms of student welfare even if their assignments are not
comparable by rank dominance.
6. Conclusion
Among the three most common school choice mechanisms, DA, BM, and ABM, only
DA is strategyproof for students, while ABM is at least partially strategyproof whereas
BM is not (Mennle and Seuken, 2017). They therefore form a hierarchy in terms of
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their incentive properties. In the present paper, we have complemented this analysis by
showing a second hierarchy in terms of student welfare points in the opposite direction.
To this end, we have taken two complementary approaches: First, we have established
the relationship between the three mechanisms in terms of rank dominance. When the
comparison of the assignments from BM, ABM, and DA is possible, then it generally
points in the expected direction (except in a very small number of cases). Using
simulations, we have also established that the share of preference profiles where this
comparison applies is sufficiently large to make the results relevant for practical market
design. Second, we have compared the rank distributions on student preference data
from the Mexico City high school match. Our computational experiments have shown
that the hierarchy persists on that data. When we care about assigning top-k choices for
k ď 5, BM is preferable to ABM which is preferable to DA (given truthful preferences).
The general lesson to be learned from our results is that a decision between BM,
ABM, and DA involves an implicit trade-off between incentives and student welfare. If
strategyproofness is a strict requirement, then DA is obviously the mechanism of choice.
When administrators are concerned about incentives but partial strategyproofness is
sufficient to elicit truthful preferences, then ABM may be a design alternative because
in this case it can improve student welfare. Finally, if the true preferences are known or
if students can be expected to submit their preferences truthfully, despite the absence of
strategyproofness guarantees, then BM yields the highest student welfare. Rather than
advocate superiority of one of the mechanisms, we provide market designers with the
means to make a conscious decision about this trade-off.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. We first establish the following lemmas about rank dominance. Let
x, x1, . . . , xK P ∆pXq be assignments such that
x “
Kÿ
k“1
xk ¨ αk (7)
for some α1, . . . , αK ą 0 with řKk“1 αk “ 1, i.e., x is the convex combination of the
assignments xk, k “ 1, . . . , K with coefficients αk, k “ 1, . . . , K.
Lemma 1. The rank distribution dx of x (at some preference profile P ) is equal to the
convex combination of the rank distributions dx
k
of the xk with respect to coefficients
α1, . . . , αK, i.e.,
dx “
Kÿ
k“1
dx
k ¨ αk. (8)
Lemma 1 is obvious from the definition of the rank distribution in Definition 1.
Lemma 2. Let y, y1, . . . , yK P ∆pXq be assignments such that
y “
Kÿ
k“1
yk ¨ αk (9)
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for the same coefficients α1, . . . , αK, and let there be rankk, k “ 1, . . . , K such that for
all k “ 1, . . . , K and all rank1 ă rankk we have
dx
k
rank1 “ dy
k
rank1 . (10)
Furthermore, if rankk ď m, then
dx
k
rankk
ą dykrankk (11)
(otherwise, dx
k “ dyk).
Then y does not even weakly rank dominate x.
Proof of Lemma 2: Let rankmin “ trankk|k “ 1, . . . , Ku be the lowest rank (i.e., the best
choice) at which inequality (11) holds strictly, and let kmin P t1, . . . , K ` 1u be an index
for which this is the case. Then for all rank1 ă rankmin and all k “ 1, . . . , K we have
dx
k
rank1 “ dy
k
rank1 , (12)
so that by Lemma 1
dxrank1 “ dyrank1 . (13)
In words, the rank distributions of x and y coincides for all ranks before rankmin.
Furthermore,
dx
k
rankmin
ě dykrankmin (14)
for all k ‰ kmin, and
dx
kmin
rankmin
ą dykminrankmin . (15)
28
Thus, by Lemma 1 and the fact that αkmin ą 0,
dxrankmin “
Kÿ
k“1
dx
k
rankmin
¨ αk (16)
“ dxkminrankmin ¨ αkmin `
Kÿ
k“1,k‰kmin
dx
k
rankmin
¨ αk (17)
ą dykminrankmin ¨ αkmin `
Kÿ
k“1,k‰kmin
dx
k
rankmin
¨ αk (18)
ě
Kÿ
k“1
dy
k
rankmin
¨ αk “ dyrankmin . (19)
We now proceed to prove the Theorem in three steps.
Step 1 (for any fixed single priority profile): First, we show that for any fixed
single priority profile pi P ΠM and any preference profile P , the assignment ypi “ DApipP q
never strictly rank dominates the assignment xpi “ BMpipP q at P . In fact, we show
something stronger, namely that the conditions of Lemma 2 are satisfied for xpi and
ypi, i.e., either dx
pi “ dypi , or there exists some r P t1, . . . ,mu such that dxpir ą dypir , and
dx
pi
r1 “ dy
pi
r1 for all r
1 ă r.
In the proof, we consider the slightly larger domain, where schools can have zero
capacity. Under DApi, including additional empty schools does not make a difference for
the resulting assignment. Under the BMpi, it is easy to see that the assignments can be
decomposed into two parts:
1. Run the first round of the mechanism, in which a set of students N1 receives their
first-choice schools.
2. Remove the students N1 from N , and also remove these students from all priority
orders in the priority profile pi. Reduce the capacities of the schools they received
by the number of students who received each school. Change the preference orders
of all remaining students by moving their first choice to the end of their ranking.
Then, run the mechanism again on the reduced problem (which may include schools
of capacity zero).
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In the final assignment resulting from BMpi, the students N1 will receive their first
choices, and the other students will receive the schools they got in the reduced setting.
Claim 1. DApipP q assigns a weakly lower number of first choices than BMpipP q.
The claim is obvious from the observation that BMpi maximizes the number of assigned
first choices.
Claim 2. If DApipP q assigns the same number of first choices as BMpipP q, then the sets
of students who get their first choices under both mechanism coincide.
Proof. By assumption, dx
pi
1 “ dy
pi
1 . Suppose towards contradiction that there exists some
student i P N , who receives her first-choice school j P M under ypi but not under xpi.
That means that j was exhausted in the first round by other students, all of whom must
have had higher priority than i (according to pi). These students as well as i would also
apply to j in the first round of DApi. But since j was already exhausted by the other
students, i will also be rejected from j in the first round of DApi, a contradiction.
Observer that under DApi students can only obtain their first-choice school in the first
round. By Claim 2, if dx
pi
1 “ dy
pi
1 , then BM
pi and DApi assign the same students to their
first-choice schools, and therefore, none of the students who received their first-choice
school under DApi (tentatively in the first round) was rejected in any subsequent round.
Thus, we can also decompose the assignment from DApi into two parts (as before for
BMpi):
1. The assignment from the first round.
2. The assignments from applying the mechanism to the reduced and altered setting.
We can now apply Claim 2 inductively to the reduced settings to show that dx
pi
r “ dypir
implies that the same students also got their rth choice under both mechanisms. Since
dx
pi
r ă dypir is impossible by Claim 1, we get that either the assignments from both
mechanism coincide entirely, or dx
pi
r ą dypir for some r P t1, . . . ,mu, i.e., the Boston
mechanism assigns strictly more rth choices than Deferred Acceptance.
Step 2 (for any single priority distributions): For any single priority distribution
P, a single priority profile pi is drawn at random according to P. By construction
x “ BMPpP q “
ÿ
pi
BMpipP q ¨ Prpis, (20)
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and
y “ DAPpP q “
ÿ
pi
DApipP q ¨ Prpis, (21)
i.e., both x and y can we written as convex combinations of assignments xpi “ BMpipP q
and ypi “ DApipP q respectively, with the same coefficients αpi “ Prpis. By Step 1, each
pair xpi, ypi has the property that dx
pi
r1 “ dy
pi
r1 for r
1 ă r ď m and dxpir ą dypir (or dxpi “ dypi).
Thus, by Lemma 2, DAPpP q never strictly rank dominates BMPpP q.
Step 3 (for any priority distribution): Harless (2015) showed that Claim 2 also
holds for multiple priority profiles. We can apply the same reasoning as in Step 2 to
obtain comparable rank dominance of BMP over DAP for any priority distribution P.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
B. Example from Section 4.3
Example 3. Consider a setting with three students N “ t1, 2, 3u, three schools M “
ta, b, cu with a single seat each, and the preference profile P “ pP1, P2, P3q with
P1 : a ą . . . , P2 : a ą b ą c, P3 : b ą c ą a.
For the single priority order pi with pij : 1 ą 2 ą 3, BMpi assigns a to 1, b to 3, and c to
2. The resulting cumulative rank distribution is cBM
pipP q “ p2, 2, 3q. For the same single
priority order, DApi assigns a to 1, b to 2, and c to 3, which leads to the cumulative rank
distribution cDA
pipP q “ p1, 3, 3q. Observe that neither assignment rank dominates the
other. Thus, BMpi and DApi are not comparable by rank dominance at this preference
profile.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2. First, we show case (1) of Theorem 2: An assignment x is first-
choice-maximizing at preference profile P if it can be represented as a lottery over
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deterministic assignments that give the maximum number of first choices, i.e.,
dx1 “
ÿ
iPN
xi,j1ripjq“1 “ max
yPX d
y
1. (22)
Since any ex-post efficient assignment is supported by a serial dictatorship, DAU puts
positive probability on all ex-post efficient, deterministic assignments. In contrast, ABMU
assigns positive probabilities to only some ex-post efficient, deterministic assignments. In
particular, ABMU is first choice maximizing, i.e., it gives no probability to any assignment
that does not yield the maximum possible number of first choices. Consequently, if
at some preference profile P there exists at least one ex-post efficient, deterministic
assignment that is not first-choice-maximizing, then DAU will assign strictly less first
choices than ABMU. At these preference profiles, DAU is guaranteed not to rank
dominate ABMU (even weakly).
Using this observation, we can now prove the following Claim 3 which in turn yields
the result.
Claim 3. For any fixed number of schools m ě 3 and any  ą 0, there exists qmin P N,
such that for any capacities q1, . . . , qm with qj ě qmin for all j P M and n “ řjPM qj
students, and for P chosen uniformly at random from Pn, the probability that DAUpP q
is first-choice-maximizing is smaller than .
For a given preference profile P P PN , the first choice profile kP “ pkPj qjPM is the
vector of non-negative integers, where kPj represents the number of students whose
first choice is j. For a fixed setting, i.e., the triple pN,M,qq, we consider a uniform
distribution on the space of preference profiles Pn. As the preference profile P is held
fixed, we suppress the index and simply write kj. We say that a school j PM is
• un-demanded if kj “ 0,
• under-demanded if kj P t1, . . . , qj ´ 1u,
• exhaustively demanded if kj “ qj,
• and over-demanded if kj ą qj.
For any first choice profile kP , one of the following cases must hold:
1. There is at least one un-demanded school.
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2. All schools are exhaustively demanded.
3. No school is un-demanded, at least one school is over-demanded, and at least one
other school is exhaustively demanded.
4. No school is un-demanded, but at least two schools are over-demanded.
5. There is exactly one over-demanded school, and all other schools are under-
demanded.
We will show that for fixed m and increasing minimum capacity, the probabilities for
cases (1) and (2) become arbitrarily small. We will further show that in cases (3), (4),
and (5), the probabilities that DAU assigns the maximum number of first choices become
arbitrarily small.
1. The probability that under a randomly chosen preference profile at least one school
is un-demanded is upper-bounded by`
m
1
˘pm´ 1qn
mn
“ m
ˆ
m´ 1
m
˙n
, (23)
which converges to 0 as n “ řjPM qj ě mqmin becomes large (where m is fixed).
2. Let q˜ “ n
m
. Without loss of generality, q˜ can be chosen as a natural number
(otherwise, we increase the capacity of the school with least capacity until n is
divisible by m). The probability that under a randomly chosen preference profile
all schools are exhaustively demanded is`
n
q1,...,qm
˘
mn
ď
`
n
q˜,...,q˜
˘
mn
À pmq˜q
mq˜
pq˜qmq˜mmq˜
d
mq˜
q˜m
“
c
m
q˜m´1
, (24)
which converges to 0 as q˜ ě qmin becomes large (where m is fixed).
3. Suppose that DAU is first choice maximizing. If one school a is over-demanded
and another school b is exhaustively demanded, then no student with first choice a
can have b as second choice. Otherwise, there exists an order of the student such
that a student with first choice a will get b. In that case, b is not assigned entirely
to students with first choice b, and hence, the assignment can not maximize the
number of first choices. Thus, the probability that the ka students who have first
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choice a all have a second choice different from b (conditional on the first choice
profile) is ˆ
m´ 2
m´ 1
˙k1
ă
ˆ
m´ 2
m´ 1
˙q1
ď
ˆ
m´ 2
m´ 1
˙qmin
. (25)
This becomes arbitrarily small for increasing qmin. Thus, the probability that the
maximum number of first choices is assigned by DAU, conditional on case (3)
becomes small.
4. This case is analogous to (3).
5. Suppose that for some preference profile consistent with case (5), DAU assigns the
maximum number of first choices. Let a be the school that is over-demanded and
let j2, . . . , jm be the under-demanded schools. Then the maximum number of first
choices is assigned if and only if
• qa students with first choice a receive a, and
• all students with first choices j2, . . . , jm receive their respective first choice.
If DAU maximizes the number of first choices, then for any ordering of the students,
the maximum number of first choices must be assigned, i.e., the two conditions are
true. If the students with first choice a get to pick before all other students, then
they exhaust a and get at most qj ´ kj of the schools j ‰ a: otherwise, if they got
more than qj ´ kj of school j, then some student with first choice j would get a
worse choice, which violates first choice maximization.
After any qa of the ka students with first choice a consume school a, there are ka´qa
students left which will consume other schools. Since n “ řjPM qj “ řjPM kj, we
get that
ka ´ qa “ n´
ÿ
j‰a
kj ´ pn´
ÿ
j‰a
qjq “
ÿ
j‰a
qj ´ kj. (26)
Therefore, the second choice profile of these ka ´ qa students must be pl2, . . . , lmq,
where lr “ qjr ´ kjr ě 1. In addition, some student i1 who consumed a has second
choice j1, and some student i2 with first choice a gets its second choice j2 ‰ j1.
If we exchange the place of i1 and i2 in the ordering, i2 will get a and i1 will get
j1. But then qj1 ´ kj1 ` 1 students with first choice a get their second choice j1.
Therefore, when the students with first choice j1 get to pick their schools, there
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are only kj1 ´ 1 copies of j1 left, which is not sufficient. Thus, we have constructed
an ordering of the students under which the number of assigned first choices is not
maximized. This implies that for any preference profile with first choice profile
satisfying case (5), DAU does not assign the maximum number of first choices.
Combining the arguments for all cases, we can find qmin sufficiently high, such that we
can estimate the probability that DAU maximizes first choices (DAU mfc.) by
QrDAU mfc.s “ QrDAU mfc.|(1)sQr(1)s (27)
`QrDAU mfc.|(2)sQr(2)s (28)
`QrDAU mfc.|(3)sQr(3)s (29)
`QrDAU mfc.|(4)sQr(4)s (30)
`QrDAU mfc.|(5)sQr(5)s (31)
ď Qr(1)s `Qr(2)s `QrDAU mfc.|(3)s (32)
`QrDAU mfc.|(4)s `QrDAU mfc.|(5)s (33)
ď 
4
` 
4
` 
4
` 
4
` 0 “ . (34)
Here, Q is the probability measure induced by the random selection of a preference
profile.
Next, we show case (2) of Theorem 2: As for the proof of case (1), we establish that
DAU is almost never first choice maximizing at a randomly selected preference profile.
Claim 4. For any  ą 0, there exists n P N, such that for any setting pN,M,qq with
#M “ #N ě n and qj “ 1 for all j PM , and for P chosen uniformly at random, the
probability that DAUpP q is first-choice-maximizing is smaller than .
Recall that for a fixed preference profile P , DAU is first-choice maximizing only if all
ex-post efficient assignments are first-choice maximizing. We will introduce no overlap, a
necessary condition on the preference profile that ensures that DAU assigns the maximum
number of first choices. Conversely, if a preference profile violates no overlap, DAU will
not assign the maximum number of first choices. To establish Claim 4, we show that the
share of preference profiles that exhibit no overlap vanishes as n becomes large.
The proof requires some more formal definitions: for convenience, we will enumerate the
set M of schools by the integers t1, . . . , nu. As in the proof of case (1), kP “ pkP1 , . . . , kPn q
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is called the first choice profile of the type profile P , where kPj is the number of students
whose first choice is school j. To reduce notation, we suppress the superscript P . For
some first choice profile k and school j we define the following indicators:
wkpjq :“
#
1, if kj ě 1
0, else
and okpjq :“
#
1, if kj ě 2
0, else.
(35)
w indicates whether j is demanded, i.e., it is the first choice of at least one student, and o
indicates whether j is over-demanded, i.e., it is the first choice of more than one student.
Further, we define
Wk :“
ÿ
jPM
wkpjq, Ok :“
ÿ
jPM
okpjq, Ck “
ÿ
jPM
kj ¨ okpjq. (36)
Wk is the number of schools that are demanded by at least one student, Ok is the
number of over-demanded schools, and Ck is the number of students competing for
over-demanded schools. Finally, a preference profile P exhibits overlap if there exists
a student i P N with first choice j1 and second choice j2, such that okP pj1q “ 1 and
wkP pj2q “ 1, i.e., student i’s first choice is over-demanded and its second choice is
demanded as a first choice by at least one other student. As an example consider a
setting where three students have preferences
P1 : a ą . . . , ą2: a ą b ą . . . , ą3: b ą . . . . (37)
The maximum number of first choices that can be assigned is 2, e.g., by giving a to 1 and
b to 3. But for the priority order 1 pi 2 pi 3, student 1 will get a and student 2 will get
b. Then student 3 cannot take b, and consequently DAU will not assign the maximum
number of first choices. If a preference profile exhibits overlap, a situation as in (37) will
arise for some priority order, and therefore, DAU will not assign the maximum number of
first choices. Conversely, no overlap in P is a necessary condition for DAUpP q to assign
the maximum number of first choices. We will show in the following that the share of
preference profiles exhibiting no overlap becomes small for increasing n.
Consider a uniform distribution (denoted Q) on the preference profiles, i.e., all students
draw their preference order independently and uniformly at random from the space of
all possible preference orders. Then the statement that the share of preference profiles
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exhibiting no overlap becomes small is equivalent to the statement that the probability of
selecting a preference profile with no overlap converges to 0. The proof of the following
Claim 5 is technical and requires involved combinatorial and asymptotic arguments.
Claim 5. QrP no overlaps Ñ 0 for nÑ 8.
Proof of Claim 5. Using conditional probability, we can write the probability that a
preference profile is without overlap as
QrP no overlaps “
ÿ
k
Qrk “ kP s ¨QrP no overlap | k “ kP s. (38)
The number of preference profiles that have first choice profile k “ pk1, . . . , knq is
proportional to the number of ways to distribute n unique balls (students) across n urns
(first choices), such that kj balls end up in urn j. Thus,
Qrk “ kP s “
`
n
k1,...,kn
˘pn´ 1q!n
pn!qn “
`
n
k1,...,kn
˘
nn
. (39)
In order to ensure no overlap, a student with an over-demanded first choice cannot have
as her second choice a school that is the first choice of any other student. Students whose
first choice is not over-demanded can have any school (except for their own first choice)
as second choice. Thus, given a first choice profile k, the conditional probability of no
overlap is
QrP no overlap | k “ kP s “
ź
jPM
˜
p1´ okpjqq ` okpjq
ˆ
n´Wk
n´ 1
˙kj¸
(40)
“
ˆ
n´Wk
n´ 1
˙ř
jPM kj ¨okpjq
“
ˆ
n´Wk
n´ 1
˙Ck
(41)
“
ˆ
Ck ´Ok
n´ 1
˙Ck
, (42)
where the last equality holds, since n´Wk “ n´ pn´ Ck `Okq “ Ck ´Ok. Thus, the
probability of no overlap can be determined as
QrP no overlaps “ 1
nn
ÿ
k
ˆ
n
k1, . . . , kn
˙ˆ
Ck ´Ok
n´ 1
˙Ck
. (43)
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Ck is either 0 or ě 2, since a single student cannot be in competition. If no students
compete (Ck “ 0), all must have different first choices. Thus, for k “ p1, . . . , 1q, the
term in the sum in (43) isˆ
n
k1, . . . , kn
˙ˆ
Ck ´Ok
n´ 1
˙Ck
“
ˆ
n
1, . . . , 1
˙
¨ 1 “ n!. (44)
Using this and sorting the terms for summation by c for Ck and o for Ok, we get
QrP no overlaps “ 1
nn
»–n!` nÿ
c“2
t c2uÿ
o“1
ˆ
c´ o
n´ 1
˙c ÿ
k:Ck“c,Ok“o
ˆ
n
k1, . . . , kn
˙fifl . (45)
Consider the inner sum ÿ
k:Ck“c,Ok“o
ˆ
n
k1, . . . , kn
˙
(46)
in (45): with a first choice profile k that satisfies Ck “ c and Ok “ o there are exactly o
over-demanded schools (i.e., schools j with kj ě 2), n´ c singly-demanded schools (with
kj “ 1), and c´ o un-demanded schools (with kj “ 0). Therefore,
ÿ
k:Ck“c,Ok“o
ˆ
n
k1, . . . , kn
˙
“
ˆ
n
c´ o
˙ ÿ
k1“pk11,...,k1n´c`oq:Ck1“c,Ok1“o
ˆ
n
k11, . . . , k1n´c`o
˙
(47)
“
ˆ
n
c´ o
˙ˆ
n´ c` o
n´ c
˙
n!
c!
ÿ
k2“pk21 ,...,k2oq:k2jě2
ˆ
c
k21, . . . , k2o
˙
.(48)
The first equality holds because we simply choose c´o of the n schools to be un-demanded,
and ˆ
n
k1, . . . , kr´1, 0, kr`1, . . . , km
˙
“
ˆ
n
k1, . . . , kr´1, kr`1, . . . , km
˙
. (49)
The second equality holds because we select the n´ c singly-demanded schools from the
remaining n´ c` o schools as well as the n´ c students to demand them. The sum (48)
is equal to the number of ways to distribute c unique balls to o unique urns such that
each urn contains at least 2 balls. This in turn is equal to
o!
##
c
o
++
, (50)
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where tt:uu denotes the 2-associated Stirling number of the second kind. This number
represents the number of ways to partition c unique balls such that each partition contains
at least 2 balls. The factor o! in (50) is included to make the partitions unique. tt:uu
is upper-bounded by t:u, the Stirling number of the second kind, which represents the
number of ways to partition c unique balls such that no partition is empty. Furthermore,
the Stirling number of the second kind has the upper bound#
c
o
+
ď
ˆ
c
o
˙
oc´o. (51)
Thus, the sum in (48) can be upper-bounded by
ÿ
k2“pk21 ,...,k2oq:k2jě2
ˆ
c
k21, . . . , k2o
˙
ď o!
ˆ
c
o
˙
oc´o. (52)
Combining all the previous observations, we can estimate the probability QrP no overlaps
from (45) by
QrP no overlaps ď 1
nn
»–n!` nÿ
c“2
t c2uÿ
o“1
ˆ
c´ o
n´ 1
˙cˆ
n
c´ o
˙ˆ
n´ c` o
n´ c
˙ˆ
c
o
˙
n!o!
c!
oc´o
fifl .
(53)
The Stirling approximation yields
?
2pie
1
12n`1 ď n!?
n
`
n
e
˘n ď ?2pie 112n , (54)
and therefore n! « `n
e
˘n?
n up to a constant factor. Using this, we observe that the first
term in (53) converges to 0 as n increases, i.e.,
n!
nn
«
?
n
en
Ñ 0 for nÑ 8. (55)
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Now we need to estimate the double sum in (53):
1
nn
nÿ
c“2
t c2uÿ
o“1
ˆ
c´ o
n´ 1
˙cˆ
n
c´ o
˙ˆ
n´ c` o
n´ c
˙ˆ
c
o
˙
n!o!
c!
oc´o (56)
“ n!
nn
nÿ
c“2
t c2uÿ
o“1
n!
pc´ oq!pn´ c` oq! ¨
pn´ c` oq!
o!pn´ cq! ¨
c!
o!pc´ oq! ¨
o!
c!
¨ pc´ oq
coc´o
pn´ 1qc (57)
“ n!
nn
nÿ
c“2
t c2uÿ
o“1
ˆ
n
c
˙ˆ
c
o
˙ˆ
n
n´ 1
˙c
1
nc
¨ pc´ oq
coc´o
pc´ oq! (58)
À
«
?
n
ˆ
n
n´ 1
˙n´1 ˆ
n´ 1
n
˙ff
1
en
nÿ
c“2
t c2uÿ
o“1
ˆ
n
c
˙ˆ
c
o
˙
1
nc
¨ pc´ oq
coc´o
pc´ oqc´o e
c´o (59)
ď “e?n‰ 1
en
nÿ
c“2
t c2uÿ
o“1
ˆ
n
c
˙ˆ
c
o
˙
1
nc
¨ pc´ oqooc´oec´o, (60)
where we use that
`
1` x
n
˘n ď ex. Using the binomial theorem and the fact that the
function o ÞÑ pc´ oqooc´o is maximized by o “ c
2
, we can further estimate (60) by
“
e
?
n
‰ 1
en
nÿ
c“2
ˆ
n
c
˙´ ec
2n
¯c t c2uÿ
o“1
ˆ
c
o
˙ˆ
1
e
˙o
ď “e?n‰ 1
en
nÿ
c“2
ˆ
n
c
˙´ ec
2n
¯cˆ
1` 1
e
˙c
(61)
ď “e?n‰ 1
en
nÿ
c“2
ˆ
n
c
˙´
α ¨ c
n
¯c
(62)
with α “ p1`eq
2
. To estimate the sum in (62), we first consider even n and note the
following:
• α “ p1`eq
2
« 1.85914 . . . ă e, and therefore, the last term of the sum for c “ n can
be ignored as
`
n
n
˘ `
α
e
˘n Ñ 0 for nÑ 8.
• `n
c
˘ “ ` n
n´c
˘
, and therefore, both terms
`
n
c
˘ `
α c
n
˘c
and
`
n
c
˘ `
αn´c
n
˘n´c
have the same
binomial coefficient in the sum.
• The idea is to estimate the sum of both terms by an exponential function of the
form c ÞÑ emc`b, where m and b depend only on n and α.
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• Indeed, the log of the sum, the function c ÞÑ log
´`
α c
n
˘c ` `αn´c
n
˘n´c¯
, is strictly
convex and on the interval
“
1, n
2
‰
it is upper-bounded by the linear function
fpcq “
ˆ
logp4q
n
´ logp2αq
˙
c` n logpαq. (63)
• Thus, ˆ
n
c
˙´
α
c
n
¯c ` ˆ n
n´ c
˙´
α
n´ c
n
¯n´c
ď
ˆ
n
c
˙
efpcq. (64)
We can bound (62) by
“
e
?
n
‰ 1
en
n
2ÿ
c“1
ˆ
n
c
˙
efpcq “ “e?n‰ 1
en
n
2ÿ
c“1
ˆ
n
c
˙
4
c
nαn
ˆ
1
2α
˙c
(65)
ď “4e?n‰ αn `1` 12α˘n
en
(66)
“ “4e?n‰ˆ 12 ` α
e
˙n
« “4e?n‰ˆ2.35914 . . .
e
˙n
. (67)
Since 2.35914 ă e, the exponential convergence of the last term dominates the divergence
of the first terms, which is of the order
?
n, and the expression converges to 0.
For odd n the argument is essentially the same, except that we need to also consider
the central term (for c “ n
2
` 1) separately.
ˆ
n
n
2
` 1
˙ˆ
α
n
2
` 1
2
˙n
2
`1
ď 2n
˜d
α
ˆ
1
2
` 1
n
˙¸n
¨ α
ˆ
1
2
` 1
n
˙
(68)
“
˜d
α
ˆ
2` 4
n
˙¸n
¨ α
ˆ
1
2
` 1
n
˙
. (69)
With
b
α
`
2` 4
n
˘ « 1.92828 . . . ă e, the result follows for odd n as well.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
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D. Data from Mexico City High School Match,
2010–2014
In this section we describe the matching procedure in Mexico City, the data we have used
for our computational experiments, and the experiments themselves. In Mexico City
around 280’000 students are assigned to around 600 educational options at public high
schools each year. The assignment is centrally organized by Comisio´n Metropolitana de
Instituciones Pu´blicas de Educacio´n Media Superior (COMIPEMS).
Matching Process (text adopted verbatim with only minor modifications from
(Chen and Pereyra, 2015)). The matching proceeds as follows:
• In late January, COMIPEMS hands out brochures disseminating information
about available options and instructions about the matching process. In addition,
information about past assignments is available to students.
• In March, after registering with COMIPEMS, students submit their preferences
over up to 20 options. Each high school offers either a single option or multiple
options. Additionally, students have to fill out a survey questionnaire.
• In June, all students simultaneously take a standardized exam. The final score is
used to determine student’s priority in the match. A minimum score of 31 out of
128 is required for eligibility. This minimum score requirement was abandoned as
of 2013 in an endeavor to extend compulsory education to high school level.
• In mid July, students have to provide their secondary school certificate to be eligible
for the match.
• In late July, the match is run in two phases:
1. Main Phase: Based on the priority defined by exam scores, COMIPEMS
allocates students using the Serial Dictatorship (SD) mechanism, which is
equivalent to the Deferred Acceptance mechanism for single priority orders,
such as those based on exam score. When students tie for the last seats at an
option, COMIPEMS consults the school either to take all or reject all tied
students.
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Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
# of options 536 569 595 611 628
# of students 276’581 270’699 269’775 280’001 284’412
# of seats (estimate) 230’074 230’194 234’340 246’317 247’977
Excess # of students 46’507 (16.8%) 40’505 (15.0%) 35’435 (13.1%) 33’684 (12.0%) 36’435 (12.8%)
Average list length 9.7 9.9 10.1 9.9 9.8
# lists with length 20 9’266 (3.4%) 9’583 (3.5%) 10’598 (3.9%) 10’917 (3.9%) 11’557 (4.1%)
Table 2: Summary statistics of data from Mexico City high school match in year 2010–
2014.
2. Second Phase: Those students who have remained unassigned because all
their ranked options are full are allowed to register in options with excess
capacity. This process is decentralized.
Description of the Data. The data for our computational experiments consists of the
preference lists submitted by the students and the number of students who were assigned
to each of the educational options in the Main Phase. Table D gives summary statistics
of this data.
The Main Phase uses the Deferred Acceptance mechanism with a cap of 20 on
preference lists. This cap and the flexibility in the capacity constraints make the
mechanism manipulable in theory. Nonetheless, for the purposes of our analysis, we treat
the submitted preferences as approximately truthful. Two insights justify this assumption:
first, any non-truthful best response under DA with caps involves ranking a maximum
number of options. However, only between 3.4% and 4.1% of the students ranked the
maximum number of 20 options and on average they ranked between 9.7 and 10.1 options.
If students had best-responded to the cap on preference lists, we would expect these
values to be much higher. Second, to find a beneficial manipulation that exploits the
flexibility of capacities, students need to know the priorities and preference reports of
all other students. As students do not possess this information, such manipulations are
unlikely to occur.
For our analysis we consider only those students who submitted their secondary school
certificate in mid July. This restriction is motivated by the fact that students who did
not submit this certificate are not eligible for any public high school, even in the Second
Phase. We do include students who submitted their certificate but whose exam score was
too low for admittance to any of the options they ranked. Our motivation for including
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these students is that our goal is to compare the performance of BMU, ABMU, and
DAU on actual student preferences in (hypothetical) settings with random priorities.
Therefore, we disregard the fact that these students did not have sufficient priority in
the particular situation of Mexico City.
The exact number of seats in each option are unknown. Moreover, the way in which
ties over last seats are broken induces some flexibility in the number of seats. As a
proxy for capacities we therefore use the number of students that were assigned to each
program in the Main Phase. As students are assigned to options with excess capacity in
the Second Phase, this represents a pessimistic estimate. In particular the total number
of students exceeds the estimated total number of seats by 12.0% to 16.8%. Thus, the
excess students will remain unassigned in our computational experiments (and possibly
more).
Data Access. This data has previously been analyzed by Chen and Pereyra (2015). It
is protected under a non-disclosure agreement between COMIPEMS and the research
team at ECARES. We are grateful to Juan Sebastia´n Pereyra of the ECARES research
team, who ran the experiment software for us on a proprietary computer system of
ECARES at the Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles in Brussles, Belgium. The experiment
software compiled the summary results, which we required for our analysis. At no point
did we, the authors of this paper, have access to any personally identifiable student
information.
Computational Experiments. For each year (i.e., 2010 through 2014) and each priority
distribution (i.e., single and multiple uniform priority distribution) we have estimated
cumulative rank distributions based on 2’000 samples of BMpipP q, ABMpipP q, and
DApipP q. For each rank k P t1, . . . , 20u we have used the Shapiro-Wilk test to verify
that the differences between the samples c
BMPpP q
k , c
ABMPpP q
k , and c
DAPpP q
k are normally
distributed. Then we have used Student’s t-test to test the estimates for difference. For
all years, priority distributions, and ranks, the estimated
{
c
BMPpP q
k ,
{
c
ABMPpP q
k , and
{
c
DAPpP q
k
are significantly different for p ă 10´15.
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Years Priority dist. KpABM,DAq KpBM,DAq KpBM,ABMq
2010, 2011, 2012 single uniform 5 7 10
2013, 2014 single uniform 5 7 9
2010, 2011 multiple uniform 7 8 10
2012 multiple uniform 7 7 10
2013, 2014 multiple uniform 6 7 9
Table 3: Rank transitions for student preferences from Mexico City, 2010–2014, single
and multiple uniform priority distributions.
E. Complete Results of Computational Experiments
Figures 7–16 show the cumulative rank distributions and rank transitions for the years
2010–2014 and for the single and multiple uniform priority distributions, analogous to
Figure 6 (which only showed the results for the single uniform priority distribution and
preference data from 2014). Table E summarizes the rank transitions that we identified.
1 5 10 15 20
100k
150k
200k
KpABM,DAq “ 5
KpBM,DAq “ 7
KpBM,ABMq “ 10
Rank
N
u
m
b
er
of
st
u
d
en
ts
BM
ABM
DA
Figure 7: Rank distributions for Mexico City student preferences, single uniform priority
distribution, 2010
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Figure 8: Rank distributions for Mexico City student preferences, single uniform priority
distribution, 2011
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Figure 9: Rank distributions for Mexico City student preferences, single uniform priority
distribution, 2012
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Figure 10: Rank distributions for Mexico City student preferences, single uniform priority
distribution, 2013
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Figure 11: Rank distributions for Mexico City student preferences, single uniform priority
distribution, 2014
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Figure 12: Rank distributions for Mexico City student preferences, multiple uniform
priority distribution, 2010
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Figure 13: Rank distributions for Mexico City student preferences, multiple uniform
priority distribution, 2011
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Figure 14: Rank distributions for Mexico City student preferences, multiple uniform
priority distribution, 2012
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Figure 15: Rank distributions for Mexico City student preferences, multiple uniform
priority distribution, 2013
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Figure 16: Rank distributions for Mexico City student preferences, multiple uniform
priority distribution, 2014
F. Failure of Ordinal Efficiency for BM, ABM, and DA
The following example shows that neither BMU, nor ABMU, nor DAU are ordinally
efficient.
Example 4. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) gave an example where DAU “ RSD is not
ordinally efficient. Consider a setting with four students N “ t1, . . . , 4u, fours schools
M “ ta, . . . , du with a single seat each, and the preference profile P “ pP1, . . . , P4q with
P1 : a ą b ą c ą d,
P2 : a ą c ą b ą d,
P3 : d ą b ą c ą a,
P4 : d ą c ą b ą a.
On P both BMU and ABMU produce the same assignment.
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Student a b c d
1 1{2 3{8 1{8 0
2 1{2 1{8 3{8 0
3 0 3{8 1{8 1{2
4 0 1{8 3{8 1{2
This assignment is ordinally dominates by an assignment where students 1 and 2 exchange
their probabilities for b and c and students 3 and 4 do the same.
Student a b c d
1 1{2 1{2 0 0
2 1{2 0 1{2 0
3 0 1{2 0 1{2
4 0 0 1{2 1{2
G. Failure of BM, ABM, and DA to Lie on the Efficient
Frontier
In this section we show that none of the mechanisms BMU, ABMU, and DAU lie on the
efficient frontier among those mechanisms that share their axiomatic incentive properties.
Definition 3 (Efficient Frontier). For some set Φ of mechanisms, we say that ϕ P Φ
is on the efficient frontier, subject to Φ, if ϕ is not ordinally dominated by any other
mechanism ϕ1 from Φ at all preference profiles where this dominance is strict for at least
one preference profile.
Before we formulate the results we need to define three more properties of mechanisms,
namely symmetry, swap monotonicity, and upper invariance.
Definition 4 (Symmetry). A mechanism ϕP is symmetric if for any preferences profiles
P P PN with Pi “ Pi1 for some i P N we have ϕPi pP q “ ϕPi1 pP q.
The neighborhood NP of a preference order P are the preference orders that differ
from P by a swap of two schools that are adjacent in the ranking under P .
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Definition 5 (Swap Monotonicity). A mechanism ϕP is swap monotonic if for any
student i P N , any preference profile pPi, P´iq P PN , and any misreport P 1i P NPi from
the neighborhood of Pi with Pi : a ą b and P 1i : b ą a, we have that either i’s assignment
does not change, or ϕPi,apPi, P´iq ă ϕPi,apP 1i , P´iq and ϕPi,bpPi, P´iq ą ϕPi,bpP 1i , P´iq.
Definition 6 (Upper Invariance). A mechanism ϕP is upper invariant if for any student
i P N , any preference profile pPi, P´iq P PN , and any misreport P 1i P NPi from the
neighborhood of Pi with Pi : a ą b and P 1i : b ą a, we have that i’s assignment for schools
from the upper contour set of a does not change (i.e., ϕPi,jpPi, P´iq “ ϕPi,jpP 1i , P´iq for all
j PM with Pi : j ą a).
For DAU “ RSD, Erdil (2014) has already shown that this mechanism does not lie
on the efficient frontier, subject to strategyproofness and symmetry when the total
number of seats strictly exceeds the number of students. In other words, there exists
a strategyproof, symmetric mechanism that ordinally dominates DAU at all preference
profiles and this dominance is strict for at least one preference profile. Proposition 1
provides similar results for BMU and ABMU.
Proposition 1. 1. BMU is not on the efficient frontier with respect to ordinal (or
rank) dominance, subject to upper invariance and symmetry.
2. ABMU is not on the efficient frontier with respect to ordinal (or rank) dominance,
subject to upper invariance, swap montonicity, and symmetry.
Proof. To see that BMU does not lie on the efficient frontier, we construct a mechanism
that is upper invariant and ordinally dominates BMU. This mechanism, BM`, is
essentially the same mechanism as BMU, except that the assignment is altered at certain
preference profiles. Again, consider the setting with 4 students and 4 schools in unit
capacity. We say that a preference profile satisfies separable wants if the schools and
students can be renamed such that
• students 1 and 2 have first choice a,
• students 3 and 4 have first choice b,
• students 1 and 3 prefer c to d,
• and students 2 and 4 prefer d to c.
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Formally,
P1 : a ą tb, c, du and c ą d,
P2 : a ą tb, c, du and d ą c,
P3 : b ą ta, c, du and c ą d,
P4 : b ą ta, c, du and d ą c.
BM` is the same as BM, except that the outcome is adjusted for preference profiles with
separable wants. Let
BM`pP q “
#
PSpP q, if P satisfies separable wants,
BMUpP q, else, (70)
where PS denotes the Probabilistic Serial mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001).
At some preference profile P that satisfies separable wants, the assignment under PS
(after appropriately renaming of the students and schools) is
PSpP q “
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ 12 0 12 01
2
0 0 1
2
0 1
2
1
2
0
0 1
2
0 1
2
‹˛‹‹‹‚. (71)
Observe that under BMU, a is split equally between 1 and 2, and b is split equally
between 3 and 4. Consequently, students 1 and 2 get no share of b and students 3 and 4
get no share of a, just as under PS. Among all assignments that distribute a and b in
this way, student 1 prefers the ones that give her higher probability at c. This is at most
1
2
, since she already receives a with probability 1
2
. Similarly, students 2, 3, and 4 prefer
their respective assignment under PS to any other assignment that splits a and b in the
same way as PS and BMU. Therefore, BM` weakly ordinally dominates BMU, and the
dominance is strict for preference profiles P with separable wants.
It remains to be shown that BM` is upper invariant. To verify this, we only need to
consider the change in assignment that the mechanism prescribes if some student swaps
two adjacent schools in its reported preference ordering. Starting with any preference
profile P , the swap produces a new preference profile P 1. If neither P nor P 1 satisfy
53
separable wants, the mechanism behave like BMU.
For swaps where at least one of the preference profiles satisfies separable wants, we
can assume without loss of generality that this is P . Such a swap will lead to a new
preference profile P 1 and one of the following three cases:
1. The new preference profile satisfies separable wants.
2. The composition of the first choices has changed.
3. The preference profile no longer satisfies separable wants, but the composition of
the first choices has not changed.
By symmetry, we can restrict our attention to student 1, whose preference order satisfies
P1 : a ą c ą d and a ą b. (72)
Case (1) implies that P 1 still satisfies separable wants with respect to the same
mappings µ, ν. Thus, BM` will not change the assignment, i.e., upper invariance is not
violated.
In case (2), student 1 has a new first choice. If the new first choice is b, she will receive
b with probability 1
3
and a with probability 0 under BMUpP 1q. If the new first choice is
c or d, the student will receive that that school with certainty under BMUpP 1q. Both
changes are consistent with upper invariance.
Finally, in case (3), the swap must involve c and d, since this is the only way in
which separable wants can be violated. Since P 1 violates separable wants, we have
BM`pP 1q “ BMUpP 1q, and therefore, a will still be split equally between the students
who rank it first, and the same is true for b. Thus, student 1 will receive 1
2
of a and
0 of b, which is the same as under BM`pP q “ PSpP q. The only change can affect the
assignment for the schools c and d. This is consistent with upper invariance.
The proof that ABMU is not on the efficient frontier is analogous. We construct the
mechanism ABM` in the same way as BM`, i.e., we take ABMU as a baseline mechanism
but replace the outcomes for preference profiles with separable wants by the outcomes
chosen by the PS mechanism.
As for BM`, we consider a swap of two adjacent schools in the preference report of
student 1, such that P satisfies separable wants.
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In case (1), when the new profile also satisfies separable wants, the assignment does
not change, which is consistent with upper invariance and swap monotonicity.
In case (2), when the composition of first choices changes, student 1 must have ranked
her second choice first. In this case, she will receive this new first choice with probability 1
3
and the prior first choice with probability 0. This is also consistent with upper invariance
and swap monotonicity.
Finally, in case (3), the swap must involve c and d. She will still receive her first choice
with probability 1
2
and her second choice with probability 0 (as in the proof for BMU).
Therefore, her assignment for the school she brought down, can only decrease, and her
assignment for the school she brought up can only increase, and both change by the same
absolute value. This is consistent with upper invariance and swap monotonicity.
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